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Estimation of Source- and Quality-Differentiated Import Demand under Aggregate
Import Quota: An Application to Japan’s Wheat
Introduction
Since a seminal work by Armington (1969), estimating source-differentiated
import demand has become a useful tool in applied international trade research.  Trade
policy evaluation and simulation require reliable estimates of the responsiveness of import
demand to international price changes.  Unfortunately, for certain commodities, reliable
estimation of import demand is a particularly arduous task given the pervasive presence of
quantitative restrictions in international trade.  Import quotas, for example, have been
implemented in many countries for a variety of products.  In spite of its apparent
importance to trade policy analysis, surprisingly little attention has been paid to investigate
the impact of an import quota on the estimation of import demand.  One exception is the
work by Bertola and Faini (1991).  They applied the theory of rationing of Neary and
Roberts (1980) to investigate the impact of an import quota on the import demand for
commodities under quota and non-quota regimes.  Similar to the work on demand and
production theory under rationing, their results allow one to predict non-rationed import
behavior from observations on a market under import rationing.  Such results are
particularly useful for investigating the effect of complete trade liberalization.  To further
research on this important, but neglected topic, we consider a different case where an
aggregate import quota is applied to a seemingly homogenous product differentiated by
country of origin.2
The objective of the present study is to provide a theoretical and empirical
methodology for the estimation of source-differentiated import demand under import
quota.   The model is developed specifically in the context of the Japanese wheat import
but applicable generally.   The wheat import demand differentiated by class and country of
origin is derived from a restricted profit function for the Japanese grain importers.  Wheat
is chosen because many importing countries rely on quota licenses for all wheat imports
(USDA 1997).  Japan is selected because Japan is one of the most important international
wheat markets.  As a result of Japan’s conversion of import quotas to tariff-rate quotas,
and agreement to reduce its state-trading markup on wheat in 1995, wheat exporters’
access to the Japanese market is expected to increase.  It is therefore of interest for
policymakers and exporters to know the potential effect of this increased market access on
the Japanese wheat import demand.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.   Section II presents a brief review of
previous estimation of the Japanese wheat import demand and summarizes some important
features of the Japanese wheat importing process.  Section III characterizes the importers’
behavior under import quota in terms of the restricted profit function.  Section IV
discusses the specification of flexible functional form models and derives a system of
import demand functions under import quota.  Finally, empirical results are presented.
Section VI is a summary with conclusions.
Background
Several previous studies estimated the Japanese wheat import demand
differentiated by class and country of origin.  Japan mainly imports five classes of wheat3
from three countries, including U.S. hard red winter (HRW), U.S. hard red spring (HRS),
U.S. white, Canada’s winter red spring number 1 (CWRS1), and Australia soft.   On the
basis of end use, hard wheat (HRW, HRS, and CWRS1) is used to produce cake and
bread, while soft wheat (U.S. white and Australia soft) is used to produce noodles.
Honma and Heady (1984) have used the Armington model to analyze Japanese wheat
import demand by class and country of origin.  Mao, Koo, Suomala, and Sakurai (1997)
have applied a multiple output–multiple input translog cost function for the Japanese flour
industry to analyze Japanese import demand for wheat.  Others have used a complete
demand system such as the almost ideal demand system, the translog expenditure, the
Rotterdam model, and Barten’s system-wide approach to analyze the Japanese import
demand for wheat classes (Henning 1986, Agriculture Canada 1987, Lee, Koo, and
Krause 1994, Wilson 1994, Schmitz and Wahl 1998).  None of these studies have
explicitly considered the impact of an import quota on the estimation of the Japanese
wheat import demand.  Such an omission may lead to biased estimates of the
responsiveness of import demand to price changes and thus limits the usefulness of these
studies.
To model import quotas, it is important to know how the wheat import quotas are
implemented in Japan.  Unfortunately, like most quantitative restrictions, the
administration of the Japanese wheat import quota lacks transparency.  Its quota
allocation guidelines are not clear.  Various designated authorities are involved in Japan’s
wheat importing process before wheat is purchased by the end users.  The Japanese Food
Agency (JFA) determines the domestic wheat purchase plan for wheat each year in August
or September in consultation with the representatives of flour millers and the domestic4
wheat producers.  After the domestic purchase plan is set, the JFA will hold semi-annual
meetings with the flour millers, bakers, the noodle industry, and private trading companies
to finalize its wheat import plan.  The quantity of wheat imported is set to clear the
domestic market at the administrated resale prices (OECD 1987).  The wheat trading
companies, licensed by the JFA, import wheat by class at world prices under aggregate
import quota and tender the wheat to the JFA at their purchase price plus a mark-up
reflecting ocean freight, insurance, carrying costs,  etc., to deliver the wheat to Japan.  The
JFA then resells the imported wheat to domestic flour and bran millers at higher
administered resale prices (Alston, Carter, and Jarvis 1990).  The mills reflect their
demand at the administrated resale price.  The Japanese government has been using the
system of import quotas and high resale prices to protect and subsidize its domestic wheat
and rice production.
Existing literature are often focused on the role of the JFA (Alston, Carter, and
Jarvis 1990, OECD 1987, Love 1991).  Little attention has been paid to differentiate
among the roles played by various authorities – between the authority to determine the
aggregate quantity of imports and those licensed to procure imports.  Given the fact that
the actual wheat imports are carried out by the private grain importers, it is useful to
consider the role of private grain importers when modeling the Japanese wheat import
demand.  The issue becomes even more interesting as the private grain importers are likely
to play a more active role in the Japanese wheat trade in the era of a more free trade.  In
the following sections, the grain importers are assumed to determine where and what to
import wheat through the pure middleman profit maximization solution, subject to an
aggregate level of wheat import set by the JFA.   The results show that modeling the5
behavior of the private grain importers provides a unique approach to the study of the
source-differentiated import demand under import quota.
The Model
The JFA sets the aggregate level of wheat imports at Q and distributes Q to each
grain importer such that Q qi
i
n
=￿ , where qi is the import quota allocated to the ith





i ￿ ￿ £ .  The
ith grain importer buys the jth class of wheat (qijk) at the world price (wjk ), and sells to
the JFA at the purchase price ( pjk ), where j and k stand for the jth wheat class and kth
origin, respectively.  Consequently the price received by the importer is the markup
( ) p w jk jk - .  The importer is assumed to have no market power over the JFA and wheat
exporters.  The ith importer also faces competitive non-wheat input market and employs
an aggregate of non-wheat inputs (i.e., labor, transportation, building, and land etc.) at
unregulated aggregate price (r).
The ith importer solves the problem
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where  ( ) Ci ￿  is a well-behaved cost function.
The first order conditions of the ith importer at an optimum are:
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where  i w  is the shadow price of an import quota, qi .  Equation (2) states that, at the
optimum, the markup adjusted for a shadow price of the import quota equals marginal
cost.   It is worth noting that, in the absence of import quota, the importers choose the
optimal import plan by equating the markup and marginal cost.
Equations (2) and (3) together provide a complete base for testing the impact of
the import quota on the import demand and supply.  The import quota has a significant
impact if the hypothesis  0 = i w  is rejected.  Application of the equations (2) and (3) will
likely require the use of firm-level panel data.  Such data are unavailable in the case of
Japan.   Because most applications of import demand utilize aggregate data, it is
important to consider conditions needed for consistent aggregation across firms.  First, a
quasi-homothetic cost function is required (Chambers 1988).  As such, we assume that
the importer’s cost function takes the Gorman polar form  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) r g q h r c q r C i i i + = , .
Second, non-jointness in production is needed in multiple-output case (Hall 1973).  This
implies that the marginal cost of importing jth wheat class from kth country of origin is
unaffected by importing level of wheat class j’th  wheat class from k’th  country of origin.
The remaining aggregation condition concerns the shadow price of import quota.
To derive the aggregate shadow price, one way is to use a quantity-share weighted
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Equation (4) implies that consistent aggregation is assured to hold only if each firm’s
share is identical across wheat classes or if all firms have the same w .  While the former
is unlikely to hold exactly, the latter holds ex post if the quota market is competitive.
Optimizing behavior compels that ex post firm’s shadow prices of import quota are
identical.
Suppose that the above conditions for consistent aggregation are met.  The
aggregate analog of the optimality conditions (2) - (3) may be rewritten as
( )   0 ;
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where w  is the shadow price of an aggregate import quota and  ( ) Q r C ;  is the industry
cost function for the grain importers.
Equation (5) implies
p w p w jk jk j k j k - = - ' ' ' ' (7)
Equation (6) indicates that, given that the consistent aggregation exists, importers
allocate their imports between different wheat classes so that the markup is the same for
all types of wheat.  In other words, to determine their optimal imports by class and
country of origin, the importers respond to the changes of relative markups rather than
price per se.
Solving equations (5) and (6) give the following supply and demand system for
imported wheat
) , (
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where  w p -  is a vector of markups by class of wheat and country of origin.  Two
important observations can be made in light of equation (8).  First, aggregate import
quotas appears directly in the import demand function.  If a system of import demand is
estimated without the relevant aggregate import quota, the estimated markup coefficients
will be biased and drawing valid inferences about the estimated markup coefficients
becomes impossible - the textbook consequences for omitting relevant variables.  The
direction of the bias induced on markup responsiveness estimates by the presence of
import quota depends on the structure of co-variances between the markups and omitted
variable (Greene 1993, p. 246).  Second, the import demand function is independent of
unregulated aggregate price of non-wheat inputs and the shadow price of the import
quota.  This feature is empirically attractive as information on the prices and usage of non-
wheat inputs.  As well the shadow price of import quotas is often hard to obtain.
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The word 'gross' signals that this measure of the profit includes all non-wheat input
cost as well as the quota rent.  The properties we assume for this function are standard:
non-decreasing in markups and quota, symmetric, convex, and linearly homogenous in
markups, continuous and twice differentiable.  The first derivative of the profit function
with respect to markup, known as Hotelling Lemma (McFadden 1978), produces both
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Empirical Specification
Duality theory has been used extensively in recent literature to analyze multiple
output production relationships.  To approximate multiple output profit function, three
locally flexible functional forms (translog, generalized Leontief, and normalized quadratic)
are often used.   It is well known that convexity is not a general property of those three
locally flexible function forms.   In our preliminary analysis, all three forms produced
positively sloped demand functions for some wheat classes.   Such results indicate that the
estimated equations were inconsistent with the convex property of the profit function.  To
ensure the estimation of a theoretically consistent profit function, convexity needs to be
imposed on estimation.  For that purpose, the normalized quadratic specification (Lau
1976) was chosen over the translog and generalized Leontief.  With the normalized
quadratic specification, one can impose convexity in markups on parameter estimates of
the restricted profit function and continue to identify separate elasticities between
individual pairs of inputs (Diewert and Wales 1987, Dupont 1991).  A multi-output































































where  jk M  is the markup of importing the  jth wheat class from the kth country of origin
( jk jk w p - ), jk M  is the markup of importing the  j’th wheat class from the k’th country of
origin ( jk jk w p - ), and  l b a   and   ,  are parameters.  This function maintains linear10
homogeneity of the profit function and is self-dual.  Define the matrix B with element
' ' , k j jk b .  Symmetry in cross markup terms is obtained by defining the matrix B to be
symmetric.  The restricted profit function satisfies convexity in markups whenever the B
matrix is positive semi-definite.   Lopez (1985) notes that the normalized quadratic profit
function imposes quasi-homotheticity.  This means that the marginal rate of substitution
between input pairs are independent of the level of outputs.  This restriction represents no
limitation of this study as non-wheat inputs do not enter equation (9).
Using equation (10), the demand and supply equations for the jth class of wheat
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It is interesting to note that, given estimates of the system of equation (12) and
(13), all parameters of the profit function can be retrieved.  As insufficient observations
often prevent researchers from estimating the profit function itself, this feature is
attractive.  It is particularly so when the shadow prices of quota are of interest.
The parameters of the demand and supply equations for the zth wheat class
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such that
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To measure responsiveness of each wheat class demand with respect to change in
the markup, the markup elasticities for wheat class are derived as
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To evaluate how demand for each wheat class respond to changes in the level of



























The term ‘gross’ is used because p  is the gross profit inclusive of all non-wheat
inputs.  The calculated gross shadow price of import quota will have two components, the
shadow price itself plus the marginal cost of importers (excluding wheat purchase cost).
As such the gross shadow price of import quota should not be interpreted as the rental
rate.  To compute the rental rate, one would need information on the marginal cost of
grain importers.12
Data and Estimation Results
The empirical estimation of equation (11), (12) and (13) requires information on
wheat sales, wheat export prices (FOB), and JFA’s wheat purchase prices (CIF Japan) by
class and country of origin.  Five classes of wheat, including U.S. hard red winter (HRW),
U.S. hard red spring (HRS), U.S. white, Canada’s winter red spring number 1 (CWRS1),
and Australia soft, are considered.  Other classes are not included in the analysis for they
account for less than 2% of Japan’s wheat imports.  The annual import data for the period
from 1971/72-1995/96 were available from the World Wheat Statistics of the International
Grain Council (IGC), the Canadian Wheat Board Annual Statistics, and USDA.
The FOB prices, C&F prices, and ocean freight rates for HRS, HRW, WHITE,
ASW, and CWRS1 are available from the IGC.  It should be noted that the FOB prices are
“asking” prices and may diverge from competitive values in recent years (Wilson 1994).
This is particularly the case of the Canadian export prices.  Since actual transaction prices
are considered to be “top” trade secrets and are not published, the extent of such
divergence is unknown.  Goodwin and Smith (1995) indicate that the asking prices likely
over state actual transaction prices as the former do not include the discounts often
associated with exports.   Since HRS, HRW, WHITE, and CWRS1 are imported from the
Pacific to Japan, a time series of the FOB prices at Pacific port is used for HRS, HRW,
WHITE, and CWRS1.  Our discussion with officials actively involved in the grain trade to
Japan indicates that these price series are more reliable (compared to the FOB prices at
Gulf).   As such we conjecture the econometric problems associated with the use of these
price series should be minimized.  Initially, the markups by class and country of origin is
calculated as the difference between the JFA’s wheat purchase prices and wheat export13
prices (FOB) differentiated by class and country of origin minus the associated freight
rates.   Some of the resulting markups for the early years between 1971/72 and 1979/80
are negative.  During that period, only the freight rates quoted for vessel size A (15-
20,000 metric ton) were reported by IGC, while, in the later years, only the rates for
vessel size B (20-35,000 metric ton) were reported.  We suspect that the negative
markups are caused by apparently larger freight rates during the period between 1971/72
and 1979/80.   To maintain reasonable degree of freedom in estimation, we cannot afford
to delete these negative markups.  The markups by class and country of origin in this
paper is then defined as the difference between the JFA’s wheat purchase prices and wheat
export prices (FOB) differentiated by class and country of origin.  The definition and
descriptive statistics of all variables are presented in Table 1.
Instead of estimating the restricted profit function in (11), the system of four
demand and supply equations in (12) was estimated.   Prior to estimation, error terms are
appended to each of the four demand and supply equations.  The random terms are
assumed to be contemporaneously correlated but serially un-correlated.  The system was
initially estimated using Zellner’s iterative seemingly unrelated regression with symmetry
imposed.   As monotonicity and convexity are not general properties of the normalized
quadratic, resulting parameters are checked for acceptance of monotonicity and convexity
in markups.   All five estimated demand equations are positive, which are consistent with
the monotonicity condition.  The presence of negative own markup and positive own price
coefficients for some wheat classes indicates that the estimated equations are inconsistent
with the convex property of the profit function.  As convexity is rejected by the data, it is
imposed by a re-parameterization procedure introduced by Wiley, Schmidt, and Bramble14
(1973).  This parameterization uses the product of a triangular matrix D and its transpose
to replace the B matrix, i.e.
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The restriction does not destroy the flexibility of the B because D contains as many
independent parameters as B does (Diewert and Wales 1987).
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The re-parameterization requires a nonlinear estimation technique.  The system
was thus estimated using a generalized Gauss-Newton algorithm as implemented in
Shazam 7.0.   Symmetric and convexity restrictions were imposed on estimation.  The
parameter estimates of the demand and supply equations are presented in Table 2.
Because the re-parameterization procedure was employed, the estimated parameters of the
markups in Table 3 are calculated from equation (22).  The standard errors are computed
by a Taylor-series expansion of the first order and then applying the standard results for
variance and covariance of linear functions of random variables (Goldberger 1964).   12 of
15 markup coefficients and all five quota coefficients were significantly different from zero
at the 5% level of significance, which suggest that the model fits data well.15
Since the theoretical model is developed acknowledging the import quota, it is
important to test whether the import demand for individual wheat class is independent of
quota.  This requires all quota coefficients to be zero.  A likelihood ratio test, conditional
on the maintained hypothesis of symmetry, homogeneity, and convexity, rejects this null
hypothesis at the 1% level of significance.  Consequently, the import quota significantly
affects the Japanese wheat import demand differentiated by class and country of origin.
Similarly, as the theoretical results crucially depend on the assumption of block non-
separability among wheat classes, it is important to verify that the estimated model
satisfies this structural property.  For the restricted profit function, as in equation (9),
block separability requires that the import demand for particular class is independent of
other classes.  This requires all cross markup coefficients to be zero.  A likelihood ratio
test, conditional on the maintained hypothesis of symmetry, homogeneity, and convexity,
rejects this null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance.   As a result, the import demand
differentiated by class and country of origin are significantly related.
Table 3 reports estimated markup and quota elasticities at the mean.  The own
markup elasticities for all wheat classes are positive as expected.  Their values are less
than one, indicating that the demands for different wheat classes are markup inelastic.  In
other words, 1% increase in markup of particular wheat class would lead to less than 1%
increase in the demand for that wheat class.  The quota elasticities are used to examine
how the change in the level of aggregate import quota affects the import demand for
individual wheat class (Table 4).  All estimated quota elasticities are positive.  The positive
sign indicates that the demand for all wheat classes is likely to increase if there is an
increase in the overall level of wheat import quota, holding prices constant.  The16
magnitudes of the quota elasticities for CWRS1, HRW, and White are much larger than
those of HRS and ASW.  The implication is that the demand for CWRS1, HRW, and
White would increase more than the demand for HRS and ASW if the Japanese wheat
import quotas were to increase.
Table 4 reports estimated price elasticities of the Japanese wheat import demand.
The own price elasticities for all wheat classes are negative as expected.   The own price
elasticities for HRS, ASW, and WHITE are elastic, while those for CWRS and HRW are
inelastic, indicating that Japanese imports of HRS, ASW, and WHITE are more sensitive
to their prices than those of CWRS and HRW.  The cross price elasticities are used to
examine competitive relationships among different wheat classes.  A positive sign indicates
competitive relations, while a negative sign indicates complementary relations.  The results
indicate the complementary relationships between CWRS1 and HRS, CWRS1 and White,
HRS and ASW, and HRW and White in the Japanese wheat market.  The complementary
relationships could be due to the blending of different types of wheat by millers (Wilson
1994).  Competitive relationships are found between CWRS1 and HRW, CWRS1 and
ASW, HRS and HRW, HRW and ASW, and ASW and WHITE.
To compare with previous estimates of price elasticities of Japanese wheat import
demand by class and country of origin, some of the recent estimates are reported in Table
5.  One observation is that the previous estimates appear to vary widely cross studies.
While some variations of the reported elasticities are expected due to different data,
different period, different market level as well as different estimation methods, they appear
to be ‘excessive’.  In terms of sign, our estimates are close to that reported by Wilson
(1994), though, in terms of magnitudes, our estimates are larger.17
To estimate the gross shadow prices of the import quotas, equation (13) needs to
be estimated.   The estimated equation (13) using OLS is
2
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where standard errors are in parentheses and an asterik * indicates significance at the 0.05
level.  The estimated gross shadow prices of import quota over the period 1971-1995 are
presented in Table 6.   The shadow prices net of freight rates are also presented in the
third column.  However, similar to the problem encountered in the markup calculation
earlier, subtracting freight rates from the gross shadow value results in some negative
numbers for the period 1971/72-1979/80.   It appears that the shadow prices net of freight
rates have been increased steadily since late 1980’s.  The fourth column is the ratio of
gross shadow prices over average markups.  The ratios suggest that gross shadow prices
track average markups well over the period 1971/72-95/96.
Concluding Comments
In this paper, a conceptual model of Japanese wheat import demand is developed
for the Japanese private grain importers facing quota licenses.   Departing from previous
studies, the Japanese wheat import demands are specified in terms of markups for different
types of wheat class and the aggregate level of import quota is explicitly incorporated in
the model.   A quota constrained, normalized quadratic profit function is then specified to
derive the unconditional wheat import demand.  The quota-constrained wheat import
demand system was estimated using the nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression with
symmetric and convexity restrictions imposed.  The testing results indicated that past18
evidence cannot be relied upon to predict future wheat import flows unless import quota
are explicitly accounted for.
Not surprisingly, our estimates of price elasticities of Japanese wheat import
demand differ markedly from previous studies.  Estimated own price elasticities suggest
that Japanese import demands for HRS, ASW, and WHITE are more sensitive to their
prices than those of CWRS and HRW, indicating that changes in wheat prices under the
current trade negotiation could affect the market shares of HRS, ASW, and WHITE more
than those of CWRS and HRW.   Estimated quota elasticities suggest that the demand for
CWRS1, HRW, and White would increase more than the demand for HRS and ASW if
the Japanese wheat import quotas were to increase.  These two results suggest that the
market shares for CWRS and HRW are likely to rise due to the increased access to
Japanese wheat market.  Estimated cross price elasticities indicate the complementary
relationships between CWRS1 and HRS, CWRS1 and White, HRS and ASW, and HRW
and White, and the competitive relationships between CWRS1 and HRW, CWRS1 and
ASW, HRS and HRW, HRW and ASW, and ASW and WHITE.
Since import quotas are widely used around the world, the approach developed
may be useful in empirical evaluation of other cases where data permits the estimation of
restricted profit functions.  The information generated is particularly important in
evaluating the effect of reduced trade barriers.19
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Table 1. Definition and Descriptive Statistics of Variables, 1971/72-95/96
Variable Definition Mean  (S.D.)
FOBASW FOB export price, Australia Soft, US$/ton 149.03 (30.18)
FOBCWRS1 FOB export price, Canada’s Winter Red Spring No. 1, US$/ton,
13.5%, Pacific (12.5% after 1994 Feb)
181.64 (33.56)
FOBHRW FOB export price,US Hard Red Winter No. 2, US $ /ton, 13%,
Pacific
147.68 (27.63)
FOBHRS FOB export price, US Hard Red Spring No. 2, US $ per ton, 14%,
Pacific
164.04 (31.65)
FOBWHITE FOB export price, US White, US $ /ton, Pacific 142.52 (25.29)
CFASW C&F import price, Australia Soft, US$/ton, as fixed at tenders held
by the Food Agency
178.52 (40.35)
CFCWRS1 C&F import price, Canada’s Winter Red Spring, US$/ton, 13.5%, as
fixed at tenders held by the Food Agency (12.5% after Feb 1994)
210.32 (42.33)
CFHRW C&F import price, US Hard Red Winter No. 2, US$/ton, 13%, as
fixed at tenders held by the Food Agency
191.56 (40.48)
CFHRS C&F import price, US Hard Red Spring N0. 2, US$/ton, 14%, as
fixed at tenders held by the Food Agency
198.00 (41.89)
CFWHITE C&F import price, US White, US$/ton, as fixed at tenders held by
the Food Agency
176.44 (35.11)
FRAUS Annual Average Freight Rates for heavy grain, US$/ton, from
Australia to Japan
19.34 (6.16)
FRPACIFIC Annual Average Freight Rates for heavy grain, US$/ton, from North
Pacific to Japan
19.24 (5.93)
MASW Markup for Australia Soft, measured as a difference between CF and
FOB prices minus freight rate, US$/ton
29.98 (13.98)
MCWRS1 Markup for Canada’s Winter Red Spring, measured as a difference
between CF and FOB prices, US$/ton
28.68 (12.77)
MHRW Markup for US Hard Red Winter, measured as a difference between
CF and FOB prices, US$/ton
43.88 (19.21)
MHRS Markup for US Hard Red Spring, measured as a difference between
CF and FOB prices, US$/ton
33.96 (17.52)22
MWHITE Markup for US White, measured as a difference between CF and
FOB prices, US$/ton
33.92 (16.32)
Table 2. Parameter Estimates of the Demand and Supply Equations, 1971/72-95/96
The Quantity of









































































Note: standard errors are in parentheses, and an asterik (*) indicates significance at the 0.05 level.23





Quantity of CWRS1 HRS HRW ASW WHITE
CWRS1 0.0266 0.0653 -0.0645 -0.0906 0.0573 1.0630
HRS 0.0774 0.4934 -0.4487 0.0674 -0.1895 0.8210
HRW -0.0409 -0.2400 0.2193 -0.0131 0.0747 1.0698
ASW -0.1205 0.0756 -0.0274 0.8178 -0.7456 0.9189
WHITE 0.0712 -0.3218 0.1804 -0.8676 0.9378 1.0811
Table 4. Estimated Price Elasticities of Japanese Wheat Import Demand at the
Sample Mean, 1971/72-95/96
The World FOB Prices of
Quantity of CWRS1 HRS HRW ASW WHITE
CWRS1 -0.1694 -0.3178 0.2177 0.4564 -0.2677
HRS -0.4937 -2.4005 1.5145 -0.3395 0.8019
HRW 0.2608 1.1675 -0.7401 0.0658 -0.3159
ASW 0.7686 -0.3680 0.0925 -4.1180 3.1548
WHITE -0.4539 1.5656 -0.6090 4.3693 -3.968324
 Table 5. Selected Previous Estimates of Price Elasticities of Japanese Wheat Import
Demand at the Sample Mean
CWRS1 HRS HRW ASW WHITE
Wilson (1994), a translog demand system, FOB prices + freight rates, 1976-88
CWRS1 0.05 -0.02 0.09 0.13 -0.25
HRS -0.02 -0.53 0.27 -0.21 0.99
HRW 0.09 0.21 -0.28 0.18 -0.21
ASW 0.19 -0.76 0.25 -0.61 0.92
WHITE -0.34 0.76 -0.25 0.83 -1.21
Lee et al. (1994), an almost ideal demand system, FOB prices, 1965-90
CWRS1 -1.51 2.15 -0.93 1.81 -1.47
HRS 3.55 -5.29 0.97 1.16 2.75
HRW -1.49 0.89 -0.27 0.08 -0.10
ASW 2.80 -2.34 0.09 -3.15 1.65
WHITE -2.90 1.10 -0.26 1.51 -0.95
Mao et al. (1997) , a translog cost function approach, JFA’s resale prices, 1976-93
CWRS1 -6.1483 4.5799 2.1342 0.5604 -1.0073
HRS 3.9684 -5.8598 1.9124 1.4839 -0.7923
HRW 2.7463 2.8400 -7.8622 -1.9921 2.0226
ASW 0.6654 2.0334 -1.8381 -3.2392 1.1288
WHITE -0.7643 -0.6938 1.1927 0.7213 -3.2487
Schmitz and Wahl (1998), Barten’s system-wide approach, FOB prices, 1970-94
CWRS1 -0.27 -0.25 0.27 0.13 -0.53
HRS -0.17 -.49 -0.16 0.38 0.25
HRW 0.19 -0.19 0.25 0.38 -0.97
ASW 0.03 0.34 0.27 -4.85 3.63
WHITE -0.27 0.30 -0.72 3.61 -2.3525
Table 6. Gross Shadow Values of Aggregate Wheat Import Quota in Japan, 1971/72-
95/96, $/metric ton
Crop Year Gross Shadow Prices Ratio of Gross Shadow Prices
Shadow Prices Net of Freight Rates Over  Average Markups
1971/72 8.00 1.17 1.33
1972/73 8.00 -3.81 /
1973/74 4.00 -22.43 /
1974/75 28.00 5.78 1.47
1975/76 23.00 8.53 1.47
1976/77 19.00 4.10 1.56
1977/78 15.00 1.01 1.74
1978/79 10.00 -7.92 /
1979/80 19.00 -12.44 /
1980/81 35.00 3.93 1.17
1981/82 37.00 11.24 1.28
1982/83 36.00 18.67 1.12
1983/84 39.00 20.76 1.21
1984/85 39.00 19.73 1.74
1985/86 27.00 9.51 1.08
1986/87 30.00 12.88 1.17
1987/88 30.00 6.07 0.88
1988/89 40.00 13.88 1.06
1989/90 45.00 17.70 1.20
1990/91 44.00 17.80 1.15
1991/92 45.00 30.74 1.14
1992/93 47.00 34.43 1.10
1993/94 50.00 37.46 0.92
1994/95 64.00 46.91 1.35
1995/96 56.00 40.11 1.27
Average 31.92 12.63 1.18